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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PIaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
RANDY OWEN PRICE, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 870447-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Aggravated Assault, 
a third degree felony, after a trial in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly denied defendants 
motion for a new trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-24(a) (1982). 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Randy Owen Price, was charged with 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978). Defendant was convicted of 
Aggravated Assault in a jury trial held July 17, 1987 in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding. On 
September 15, 1987, defendant was sentenced by Judge Eves to 
serve a term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of March 7, 1987 at about llsOO p.m., 
defendant attended a college party with his wife, Melinda Price, 
and their friends Larry Gore, Donna Gore and Kim Codebo (T. 
159).1 The victim, Mike LaPour, arrived with his friends soon 
thereafter (T. 43)• For a nominal cover charge, party guests 
could drink all the beer and "animal punch" they desired (T. 62). 
Donna Gore, who had become heavily intoxicated and 
argumentative, began yelling at the Mr. LaPour and tossed some 
beer on him (T. 170-72). The arguing continued until both Gore 
and LaPour were ejected from the party (T. 99-100). LaPour1s 
friend, Kelly Edwards, escorted him to his pickup truck (T. 100). 
Gore followed and continued to taunt LaPour by tossing stones at 
his truck (T. 100). 
Soon after, defendant and Kim Codebo appeared and 
joined Gore (T. 101). Codebo produced a gun, approached the 
passengers side of the truck where LaPour was seated, and ordered 
Edwards to back away from the truck (T. 102-04). As Edwards 
backed away, Codebo put the gun barrel to the victim's head and 
said "you ainft so bad now" (T. 105-06). 
Edwards moved towards Codebo saying, "knock it off," 
but was again ordered at gunpoint to back away (T. 106). 
1 «T« refers to the Trial Transcript dated July 17, 1987. 
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Defendant approached LaPour in the doorway of the truck, jumped 
on top of him, and began a struggle (T. 106). Meanwhile, Gore 
was standing nearby screaming, "cut him" (T. 107). Defendant 
pulled a knife and cut LaPour across the chest and arm (T. 51) . 
Just then, a car approached and the attackers fled (T. 106-07). 
Edwards immediately ran over to LaPour where he observed blood on 
LaPour1s arm and chest (T. 107). He then drove LaPour to the 
hospital for treatment (T. 106-07). 
The next morning, police officers arrested defendant at 
a nearby motel and found a blood-stained pocket knife in his 
possession (T. 139-43, 151). Defendant admitted to the officers 
that he had been involved in a fight at the college party (T. 
145)• Codebo was also arrested with a loaded Colt .45 automatic 
tucked in his waistband (T. 126-28). 
SUMMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a new trial where the alleged new evidence consisted of 
cumulative impeachment evidence which was immaterial considering 
the totality of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant his motion for a new trial. Specifically, 
defendant claims that the newly discovered testimony of Diana 
Hunt justified a new trial. Ms. Hunt, a co-worker of defendant's 
wife, signed a post-trial affidavit claiming that LaPour had told 
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her that he was stabbed by a "black guy at a party." (See 
Appendix "A"*) 
A motion for new trial is governed by Rule 24(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-24(a) (1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "the 
decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion 
with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
(Utah 1985). The Court has further explained that it is a 
"matter solely within the discretion of the trial court as to 
whether it should grant a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence." State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 438, 439 (Utah 
1973). A trial court's decision "will be deemed an abuse of 
discretion only in such instances where there is a grave 
suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because of the 
lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new evidence 
will supply;" I£. at 439-40. In other words, "[i]f there be 
evidence before the court upon which reasonable men might differ 
as to whether or not the defendant is guilty, the trial court may 
deny a motion for a new trial." 1&. at 440. 
Three criteria must be met in a motion for a new trial 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence. These are: (1) that 
the evidence is material and newly discovered, (2) that using due 
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diligence it could not have been discovered prior to trial, and 
(3) that the evidence is substantial enough that, with itf there 
might have been a different result. Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 
P.2d 369f 372 (Utah 1980). 
In the present caser the new evidence consisted of a 
prior inconsistent statement of the victim. (See Addendum "A".) 
Such evidence merely goes to the credibility of the victim and 
the weight to be afforded his testimony. Impeachment evidence is 
generally considered insufficient to warrant a new trial. Moore 
V, Illinois* 408 U.S. 786 (1972); United States v. Meyers. 534 
F.Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In Meyers, the court held that: 
Newly discovered evidence that merely goes to 
impeach the credibility of a prosecution 
witness is ordinarily not sufficient to 
justify a new trial, . • . particularly when 
the newly discovered evidence would be "only 
an additional part of a cumulative attack on 
a witness1 credibility." 
Meyers, 534 F.Supp. at 756 (citations omitted) quoting. United 
States Vt gilbert* 668 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1981) cert. &£ai£L&r 456 
u.s. 946 (1982). ££& also, Mesarosh y. United gtatesr 352 u.s. 
1, 9 (1956) . 
At trial, defense counsel attempted to impeach the 
victim by pointing out prior inconsistent statements from his 
preliminary hearing testimony (T. 71). Following the Meyers 
rationale, this court should find that the new impeachment 
evidence is merely cumulative and insufficient to justify a new 
trial. 
In addition, the newly discovered evidence is 
insubstantial, immaterial and unlikely to produce a different 
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result when compared to the totality of the evidence. In its 
order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court found 
that: 
the proposed testimony of Diana L. Hunt as 
contained in he proffered affidavit would not 
have had any impact on the outcome and the 
omission thereof from the trial would not 
have a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of the Defendant herein, for the 
reason that there was no testimony at the 
time of the trial that the "black guy" was 
anywhere near the pick-up truck where the 
crime occurred, and the most credible witness 
of all was Mr. Edwards who, not being under 
the influence of any alcohol, testified 
clearly and convincingly that he placed Mr. 
Lopour inside the truck, that Mr. Lopour had 
no injuries at that time, that he then saw 
the Defendant enter the truck or make furtive 
movements through the open truck door toward 
Mr. Lopour, and that immediately thereafter, 
Mr. Edwards saw Mr. Lopour bleeding. 
(See Appendix "B".) Additionally, the police officer's testified 
that defendant possessed a knife and Codebo a gun when they were 
arrested (T. 126-27, 141-42). Defendant also admitted having 
been in a fight at the party (T. 145). 
In light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant 
and the immateriality of the newly discovered evidence, the trial 
court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY, submitted this & (~- day of April, 1988, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to James L. Shumate, Attorney for Defendant, 110 North Main 
Street, Suite H, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this 
day of April, 1988. 
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APPENDIX A 
JAMES L. SHUMATE 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone (801) 586-3772 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
vs. 
RANDY 
OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
OWEN PRICE, 
Defendant. 
i AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
| MOTION FOR NEW TRIA 
i Criminal No. 1123 
STATE OF UTAH
 # ) 
:ss. 
County of Iron ) 
Diana L. Hunt being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. I am an adult female resident of Iron County, State 
of Utah, over the age of 18 years and competent to testify as to 
the matters set forth hereinafter from personal knowledge. 
2. I personally know one Mike LaPour, the victim in 
the above-entitled case and have known him since 1983. 
3. At a home in Cedar City approximately 2 \ eeks after 
Mike LaPour was injured I had a conversation with him. During 
this conversation I informed Mr. LaPour that I had heard that he 
had been stabbed at a party. Mr. LaPour responded that he had 
been stabbed at a party and then pulled up his shirt to diplay a 
scar on his chest and also displayed a scar on his forearm. 
0123 
Mr. LaPour then told we that he had been stabbed by Ma black guy 
at a party". 
4. I had been unaware that the above-named Defendant 
Randy Price was being charged or tried for an assault upon Mike 
LaPour and learned of this only after discussing the case with 
Mrs. Price at the American Siesta Motel where we both work. I 
did not weet Mrs. Price until after the trial of Randy Price. 
DATED this I ^ day of Augrrrt-r—1987 . 
}t<X4ifl, ./. /{tCStf-
DIANA L. HUNT 
.s£ 
Subscribed and sworn to before we this _/ day of 
tagTOt, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY ^ UBElC 
>^Resid iding at:. Cedar City, Utah 
0130 
APPENDIX B 
«1 
KEITH F. OEHLER 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
95 North Main, Suite #22 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. 
RANDY OWEN PRICE, ] 
Defendant. 
) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
> District Court No. 112J" 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 15th day of 
September, 1987, prior to the imposition of sentence herein. The 
State of Utah was represented by Keith F. Oehler, Chief Deputy 
Iron County Attorney, and the Defendant was present in person and 
represented by his Counsel, James L. Shumate, Esq, Having heard 
the arguments of Counsel, the Court finds that the proposed 
testimony of Diana L. Hunt as contained in her proffered 
affidavit would not have had any impact on the outcome and the 
omission thereof from the trial would not have a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of the Defendant herein, for the 
reason that there was no testimony at the time of the trial that 
the "black guy" was anywhere near the pick-up truck where the 
crime occurred, and the most credible witness of all was Mr. 
Edwards who, not being under the influence of any alcohol, 
testified clearly and convincingly that he placed Mr. Lopour 
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inside the truck, that Mr. Lopour had no injuries at that time, 
that he then saw the Defendant enter the truck or make furtive 
movements through the open truck door toward Mr. Lopour, and that 
immediately thereafter, Mr. Edwards saw Mr. Lopour bleeding. 
THEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is hereby 
denied. ~ 
DATED this September, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED as t o form and 
conten t t h i s day 
of September, 1987: 
JhHtS L. SHUMATE 
/ A t t o r n e y for Defendant 
J . ^ H I L I P EVES 
D i s t r i c t Court (fludge 
- 2 -
0* 
